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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
This paper studies lifetime aggregate labor supply with endogenous workweek length. Such a theory is 
needed to evaluate various government policies. A key feature of our model is a nonlinear mapping from 
hours worked to labor services. This gives rise to an endogenous workweek that can differ across 
occupations. The theory determines what fraction of the lifetime an individual works, not when. We find 
that constraints on workweek length have different consequences for total hours than total labor services. 
Also, we find that policies designed to increase the length of the working life may not increase aggregate 
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 As an empirical matter, the amount of labor supplied by an individual over his or 
her lifetime is effectively characterized by two numbers: the fraction of lifetime spent in 
employment, and the hours worked when employed. In this paper we develop a tractable 
dynamic general equilibrium model that delivers this characterization as an equilibrium 
outcome and present some of its implications for policy analysis and data interpretation.  
The key feature of our model is a nonlinear mapping from hours of work in a 
given period to labor services provided in that same period. Specifically, at low hours of 
work this mapping is convex, due to such factors as the costs associated with getting set 
up in a job, communicating with coworkers, meeting with supervisors, and so on. At high 
hours of work this mapping is assumed to be concave, due to fatigue.
1  Similar to 
Hornstein and Prescott (1993), this nonlinearity implies that workweeks of different 
lengths are not perfect substitutes in generating labor services, but does so in a much 
more tractable manner.  
We embed this feature of technology into a dynamic model populated by a 
continuum of identical individuals and study efficient allocations and competitive 
equilibrium outcomes for this economy. Two key findings emerge. First, efficient 
allocations are completely characterized by two numbers: the fraction of lifetime spent in 
employment by each individual, and hours worked while employed. Second, although 
this economy possesses an important nonconvexity, we show that efficient allocations 
can be achieved as competitive equilibria with only a standard set of Arrow-Debreu 
markets: markets for consumption and labor services at each date. In particular, there is 
no need to allow for trade in lotteries or sunspots in order to implement efficient 
                                                 
1 Rosen (1978) also noted that this formulation was a tractable way to think about intensive and extensive 
margins of labor supply.   2
allocations, as in Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b), Rogerson (1988), or Shell and 
Wright (1993).  
To illustrate the usefulness of the model, we use it to consider the effects of 
several policies: a tax and transfer policy, a restriction on workweek, and a restriction on 
fraction of lifetime devoted to work. Several interesting findings emerge. First, the model 
implies a large aggregate labor supply elasticity in response to tax and transfer programs, 
and at the same time it predicts a very small (in fact, zero) elasticity for hours of work of 
continuously employed individuals. In this regard, the model mimics the implications of a 
model that simply assumes labor is indivisible. A key message is that in our model, the 
aggregate labor supply elasticity with respect to changes in taxes is a function not only of 
preference parameters, but also of technology parameters. Specifically, features of the 
mapping from hours of work to units of labor services are critical in determining the 
aggregate labor supply elasticity.  
A second finding is that any distortion to one component of lifetime labor supply 
will be at least partially offset by movements in the other component. Increasing working 
life by changing the nature of social security benefits, for example, will lead to a decrease 
in the workweek. This has important implications for how policy makers forecast budget 
implications associated with social security reform. Third,  distortions to lifetime labor 
supply can also lead to changes in hours of work and labor services in opposite 
directions. For example, we show that a decrease in the workweek can lead to greater 
aggregate hours of work but lower output.  
An additional implication of an exogenous restriction on workweek length in our 
model is that the equilibrium wage per hour of work necessarily decreases. In practice, 
many governments that adopt workweek restrictions in an attempt to increase   3
employment (and thereby total hours of work) also simultaneously adopt policies that 
lead to higher wages per hour of work. When the hourly wage rate is not allowed to fall, 
it no longer follows that a restriction on hours will necessarily increase aggregate hours 
of work. This is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature. 
Any theory of workweek length should be able to account for the simple 
observation that workweek length differs significantly across occupations. By 
emphasizing the role of technology as a determinant of optimal workweek length, our 
theory provides a natural explanation for such differences. We illustrate this by 
developing a two-occupation version of our model with endogenous occupational choice. 
This extension provides an interesting implication about the relationship between labor 
supply elasticities estimated from a cross-section of workers and the aggregate elasticity 
associated with a change in taxes. Specifically, in our model the cross-section elasticity 
of hours with respect to wages produces an estimate of the preference parameter that 
determines the curvature in the disutility of work function. However, because of the 
nonconvexity in technology, this preference parameter is irrelevant for the response of 
aggregate hours to the tax and transfer program we study.   
An outline of the paper follows. Section 1 presents some motivating observations 
from the data. Section 2 introduces the nonconvex technology in a static setting, and 
Section 3 analyzes equilibrium in the dynamic setting. Section 4 presents the policy 
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1.  Motivating Facts 
In this section we present five facts concerning labor supply over the lifetime that serve 
as motivation for the model that we develop in the next section. The first two facts 
concern changes in the nature of work over the life cycle for individuals with at least a 
moderate attachment to the labor force. We consider the cutoff for this to be working 
more than 800 hours during the year, which is just over 15 hours per week. 
Fact 1: In the United States, the fraction of people working at least 800 hours declines 
significantly with age.   
The supporting evidence is shown in Figure 1, which shows the fraction of individuals 
working more than 800 hours per year as a function of age, based on the 2004 CPS.  
 
Figure 1 
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Source Data: CPS 2004 
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Note that the fraction of individuals working above this threshold level begins to decrease 
in the late 40s and falls relatively smoothly through to the early 70s, at which point it 
flattens out somewhat. This value drops by roughly a quarter between the ages of 48 and 
60.  
The next fact considers what happens to the amount of work performed by those 
individuals working more than 800 hours per year. 
Fact 2:  In the United States, hours worked per person for those individuals who work at 
least 800 hours per year declines little with age.   
The supporting evidence is shown in Figure 2, which plots annual hours of work 
conditional on working at least 800 hours per year, again using data from the CPS for 
2004. 
Figure 2 











Source Data: CPS 2004 
Hours Worked by Those Who Work More Than 800 Hours, U.S. 2004   6
Note that the decrease in hours is much smaller than the decrease in the fraction of 
individuals working more than 800 hours per year. Moreover, the hours series is 
relatively flat beyond age 60. Taken together, Facts 1 and 2 imply that changes along the 
extensive margin dominate both the decrease in hours for those above 50 and the increase 
in hours worked for younger workers. Put somewhat differently, the fraction of life spent 
in employment seems a key margin. 
The next fact notes the importance of this margin in understanding differences in 
hours of work across countries.  
Fact 3: About half the difference in hours worked between the United States and 
continental Europe is accounted for by differences in the fraction of lifetime worked.  








   
 
Source: OECD Database   7
This figure shows relative employment rates for five age groups (15–24, 25–34, etc.…) 
for four countries in continental Europe relative to the United States. Note that for prime-
aged individuals the relative employment rate is approximately one, and that it decreases 
quite significantly at younger and older ages. The important message here is that 
individuals in these European countries spend a much smaller fraction of their life in 
employment.  
  Although our analysis will not focus on business cycle movements, the next fact 
notes that the analogous finding carries over to this context as well. 
Fact 4: Cyclically in the United States the principal margin of adjustment is the fraction 
of the working age population employed.  Hours worked per worker in a given week vary 
little. 
Cho and Cooley (1994) establish this fact. They find that three-quarters of the 
variation in total hours of employment takes the form of movements in and out of the 
labor force rather than adjustments in average hours of work. 
The last fact that we document is that there are significant differences in hours of 
work across groups of workers. 
Fact 5:  There are sizable differences in workweek lengths across categories of workers 
based upon occupation and education.  
Table 1 highlights the differences across occupations. 
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Table 1 
Weekly Hours Worked for Selected Occupations* 
Less than 40 Hours  Between 40 and 45 Hours  More than 45 Hours 
Food Preparation and 
Serving (36.11)  Legal (44.76)  Management (45.98) 
Building and Grounds 
Maintenance (38.96) 
Education, Training and 
Library (40.76) 
Farming, Fishing and 
Forestry (45.09) 
Office and Administrative 
Support (38.87) 
Healthcare Practitioners 
and Technical (40.21)  Extraction Workers (51.30)
 Sales  (41.29)   
 Construction  (41.95)   
 Production  (41.40)   
* Includes people working more than 800 hours per year.  
Source Data: CPS 2004 
 
2.  Static Model of Intensive and Extensive Margins 
  Two key messages emerge from the previous section. First, the fraction of life 
devoted to employment is a key margin of labor supply for an individual. Second, the 
choice of hours conditional on employment seems to respond to features of the economic 
environment such as those associated with differences in occupation. In this section we 
develop a static model that delivers intensive and extensive margins of work as part of its 
equilibrium. In the next section we embed this model in a dynamic setting to produce a 
model in which the fraction of life devoted to work is a key margin, and in which features 
of technology can influence the choice of hours along the intensive margin.  
  We assume a continuum of identical individuals who derive utility from 
consumption of a single good (c) and leisure (1−h). Time devoted to market work is   9
denoted by h, and each individual has a unit time endowment. For simplicity we consider 
a utility function that is separable between consumption and leisure, so preferences are 
described by the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function: 
  () () uc vh −   (1) 
where u(c) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable, 
and  ) ( ~ h v is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice continuously differentiable. We 
also normalize v ~  so that  (0) 0 v =  . 
      There is a constant returns to scale technology that uses labor services (L) to 
produce the single consumption good. We normalize the marginal product to one and 
hence write the production technology as 
 C=L,  (2) 
where uppercase letters denote aggregates. It is standard to assume that an individual's 
input of labor services is either equivalent to their time devoted to market work, or more 
generally proportional to their time devoted to market work. Central to our model is the 
notion that time devoted to work is not the same as input of labor services. In particular, 
we assume that the mapping from individual time devoted to market work to input of 
labor services is nonlinear and write 
 l=g(h), (3) 
where l is the quantity of labor services yielded by an individual who supplies h units of 
time. The function g is assumed to be increasing and twice continuously differentiable, 
with g(0)=0, but is first convex and then concave. In particular, we assume that there is 
some  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ h , such that g′is weakly increasing on  ) , 0 [ h and weakly decreasing on 
] 1 , [h . Figure 4 shows a particular function with these properties.   10
Figure 4 
Mapping from Hours of Work to Labor Services 
 
 The  g function captures two key economic features. The first is the possibility that 
long hours of work lead to fatigue, so that past some point additional units of time input 
lead to lower increments in labor services. This is captured by the fact that g may be 
strictly concave over the interval  ] 1 , [h . The second economic feature that is captured by 
the g function is that for a range of hours worked, replacing one worker who supplies h 
units of time with two workers who each supply .5h units of time implies a lower input of 
labor services. In reality, a variety of factors contribute to this effect, including such 
things as set-up costs, supervisory time, and coordination issues. While for some issues it 
may be important to explicitly model these underlying factors, we believe that embedding 
them directly into the g function is a useful and powerful abstraction. Note that this last 
property of g is consistent with the observation that for many activities, firms do not 
consider part-time workers.
2 
                                                 
2 There are, of course, some activities for which firms prefer part-time workers, due to factors such as the 
timing of demand. Our analysis can accommodate differences across activities by allowing the g function 
to differ across occupations or sectors. We present a two-occupation example in Section 5. 
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      The properties that we have embedded in g have important implications for the 
form that efficient resource allocations take in this economy. In particular, if we had 
assumed that g was simply the identity function, then (equal weight) efficient allocations 
in our economy would have the property that all individuals devote the same time to 
market work and enjoy the same consumption. This result would continue to hold if we 
assumed that g were everywhere concave. However, this is not necessarily the case when 
the g function contains a convex region as we have allowed. 
      To  pursue  this  issue,  it  is  convenient to consider a change in variables. In 
particular, rather than considering the nonconvexity in the technology, we consider a 
transformation that places the nonconvexity in preferences. To do this, rather than 
considering preferences defined over consumption and time devoted to market work, we 
instead define preferences over consumption and the supply of labor services. This is 
easily accomplished, since there is a one-to-one mapping between time devoted to market 
work and the supply of labor services. Letting 
1 − g  denote the inverse function of g, we 
now define preferences as 
  () () uc vl − , (4) 
where 
 )) ( ( ~ ) (
1 l g v l v
− = . (5) 
In order to have a nicely behaved v function, we impose some additional structure on the 












 is   12
weakly decreasing.
3 Given our assumptions on g and v ~ , it follows that v is strictly 
increasing and twice continuously differentiable, that  (0) 0 v = , and that v is initially 
concave and then later convex. Figure 5 shows a particular function with these properties. 
Figure 5 
Disutility from Labor Services 
 
  The two formulations of the problem are analytically equivalent, but the labor 
services formulation allows for a simple graphical exposition. Figure 5 geometrically 
illustrates why the nonconvexity of the g function may affect the form of efficient 
allocations. The dashed line in this figure is the steepest line passing through the origin, 
which is no greater than v(l) at all points. This line has a point of tangency with the v(l) 
curve at l . It is straightforward to show that it would never be optimal to have workers 
supply labor services less than l , which necessarily translates into the statement that it 
would never be optimal for all workers to supply less than h hours, where l  () g h = . The 
                                                 








g  cross 
1 at most.   13
reason for this is simple: suppose that all workers were to supply labor services less than 
l . Then by placing appropriate fractions of individuals at 0 and l , a social planner can 
have the same aggregate input of labor services, but the average disutility associated with 
obtaining this given labor input will be less, since the dashed line lies everywhere below 
the v(l) curve for  ) , 0 ( l l ∈ . 
      More generally, one can show that the optimal allocation will take one of two 
forms: either all individuals supply the same labor services, and this value is at least l , or 
there is one group of individuals that supplies 0 units of labor services and another group 
that supplies l  units of labor services. Strict concavity of u(c) implies that a Social 
Planner who is maximizing an equal weighted integral of individual utilities would 
necessarily allocate consumption evenly across all individuals, independently of the labor 
services provided by a given individual. In the case where not all individuals supply 
positive units of labor services, the solution to this Social Planner's problem does not 
determine which individuals supply positive units of labor services, but only the fraction 
of individuals who supply positive units.  
It is straightforward to show that this Social Planner's problem has a unique 
solution for the fraction of individuals who work (e), the labor services provided by those 
who work (l), and consumption of all individuals (c). Recalling that v(0)=0, these values 
are solutions to the following problem: 
  max ( ) ( )
c,e,l
 uc e vl −  
  01 0 ( 1 ) s.t. c el, e ,  l g = ≤≤ ≤≤    14
The interesting case is the one where the solutions for e and l are both interior. In this 
case, after substituting the resource constraint into the objective function, one obtains the 
following two first-order conditions for e and l, respectively: 
  () ( ) u' el l    v l =  (6) 
  () ( ) u' el     v' l =    (7) 







= . (8) 
This condition says that the optimal level of labor services per worker should equate the 
marginal disutility per unit of labor services to the average disutility per unit of labor 
services. Geometrically, this is the property that l possessed in Figure 5.
4 Note that this 
condition does not depend on the level of e, as long as the solution for e is interior. Given 
a solution for l, it is then straightforward to use either Eq. (6) or Eq. (7) to solve for the 
optimal value of e. Given that l is determined, the value of time devoted to market work 
is easily determined by inverting the function g. 
      The allocation just described implies that not all individuals will devote the same 
number of hours to market work, but that all individuals will receive the same 
consumption. As a result, this allocation cannot be achieved as a competitive equilibrium 
unless lotteries or sunspot contracts are considered. The fact that decentralizing optimal 
allocations requires randomization has been seen by some as an argument against 
focusing on these allocations. In the next section we show that once one moves to a 
                                                 
4 From Figure 5 one can see that there are actually two values of l for which this condition holds, but the 
second-order conditions for an optimum are violated at the lower value, since it occurs in the region where 
v is concave rather than convex. 
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lifetime setting as opposed to a static setting, optimal allocations can be decentralized 
without resorting to any randomization. 
 
3.  Lifetime Labor Supply 
In this section we extend the static analysis of the previous section to a dynamic 
context in which individuals live for many periods. For reasons that will become clear 
soon, we model time as continuous and assume that the horizon of the economy is 
normalized to 1, so that time runs continuously from 0 to 1. As noted previously, we can 
use either the hours of work or the units of labor services formulation for our analysis. 
Here we choose to focus on observables, and thus present the results for the hours of 
work formulation.  
All of the primitives are identical to those from the previous section, and lifetime 




[ (() ) (() ) ] uct -vht d t ∫   (9) 
when we consider the consumption space to be consumption and time devoted to market 
work. We have assumed no discounting to simplify the presentation, but this is not 
essential to the arguments. 
  We continue to assume that there is no capital in the economy, so that labor 
services are the only input into production. This implies that 
 Y (t)=L(t)  (10) 
at each point in time, where capital letters denote aggregates. 
      While it remains true that one can generate efficient allocations (i.e., allocations 
that maximize an equal weighted integral of utilities) by simply applying the random   16
allocation of the previous section at each instance of time, it turns out that one can also 
achieve the same outcome in utility space without resorting to any randomization. In 
particular, rather than having the Social Planner randomly choose a fraction e of 
individuals to work at each instance, the Social Planner can instead have each individual 
work for a fraction e of their lifetime, and then simply coordinate these choices across 
individuals so that at each point in time the fraction of individuals working is also equal 
to e. It is straightforward to see that these two allocations are both feasible and that they 
both generate the same expected utility to individuals. 
  The importance of this observation is that it also tells us that we can decentralize 
efficient allocations without resorting to any randomization. In particular, consider the 
setting in which the commodity space consists of consumption and labor services 
supplied. We consider an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, in which markets for consumption 
and labor services at all dates exist at time zero, and denote the price of consumption and 
labor services at time t by p(t) and w(t), respectively.
5 Given the linear technology, 
competitive equilibrium requires that w(t)=p(t) at each instant. It is easy to show that in 
equilibrium the price p(t) must be constant over time, in which case we can normalize all 
prices to one. 
  With this normalization, the problem of each consumer in equilibrium is given by 
  ∫ −
1
0
) ( ), ( ] )) ( ( ~ )) ( ( [ max dt t h v t c u




(() ) 0 () 1 () 0 s.t. c(t)dt g h t dt,  h t ,  c t = ≤≤ ≥ ∫∫  
                                                 
5 We note for future reference that in this economy, the wage per unit of labor services is not the same as 
the wage per unit of time.    17
But this problem is exactly identical to the problem that the Social Planner solves in the 
static model, so that the individual choice problem can be recast as choosing a fraction e 
of his or her lifetime to work and the hours of work h to be supplied at those instances 
when he or she works. That is, each individual solves 
  max ( ) ( )
c,e,l
uc e vh −   
 1 0 1 0 ) ( ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ = h ,  e , h eg  c s.t. . 
A simple result emerges: in a dynamic model such as this one with nonconvexities, the 
fraction of life spent in employment becomes a key dimension of labor supply. In fact, in 
this particular model where individuals do not have any age-varying characteristics, the 
notion of individual labor supply at a given point in time has no meaning. The only object 
that has meaning is the lifetime labor supply of the individual, and how this lifetime labor 
supply is decomposed along the intensive and extensive margins. 
  As just noted, the model studied here is only able to pin down an individual’s 
lifetime labor supply, not his or her timing of work.
6 Including life cycle effects such as 
age-varying productivity or age-varying disutility of work, and considering an 
overlapping generations model serves to eliminate this indeterminacy.
7 In this case 
individuals will choose to work when productivity is highest (or disutility lowest). One is 
then able to produce well-defined working lives as seen in the data. Specifically, agents 
enter the labor force at some date and work continuously until retirement, after which 
time they exit the labor force forever. We abstract from life cycle effects in the remainder 
of this paper in order to simplify the analysis and focus attention on the key dimension of 
                                                 
6 Mincer (1962) demonstrated a similar result with regard to the labor supply of married women. 
7 Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) construct a model of this nature.    18
fraction of lifetime devoted to work in the most transparent setting. However, we note 
that most of our key results continue to hold after the inclusion of life cycle effects.  
 
4.  Policy Analysis 
In this section we use our model to analyze several different policies of interest. 
The first is a simple tax and transfer scheme that is neutral across ages, in the spirit of 
Prescott (2004). We then consider policies that directly distort the two key margins of 
lifetime labor supply, either by legislating the workweek or retirement age, or by 
specifying social security payments in a manner to target a particular retirement age. 
 
4.1.  Labor Supply Elasticity and Taxes 
In this subsection we analyze the implications of a tax and transfer policy on the 
length of the standard workweek and the fraction of the lifetime spent in employment. 
Hence, we now extend the baseline model to include a tax and transfer program. 
Specifically, we assume that the government taxes all labor income at the constant rate of 
τ and uses the tax revenues to fund a lump-sum transfer. The lifetime utility 
maximization problem can be written as 
  ,,
max   log( ) ( )
  . .      (1 ) ( ) ,
ceh
ce v h





where τ is the tax on labor income and T is the transfer. Government budget balance 
implies that the transfer must satisfy 
) (h g e T τ = .   19
The empirically interesting solution to this problem is the interior solution. Hence, this is 
the case we consider. The first-order conditions for this problem with respect to e and h, 
respectively, are 
  0 ) ( ~
) ( ) 1 (










  0 ) ( ~
) ( ) 1 (










From the first-order conditions we can derive expressions that determine the optimal 




















= . (14) 
Note that in writing Eqs. (13) and (14), we have utilized the fact that  ) (h g e T τ = .  
Let 
* h and 
* e  denote equilibrium values in the benchmark model when there is no tax 




* e e < τ , 
* h h = τ  and 
* *h e h e < τ τ . 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Eq. (13) determines the optimal length of the workweek. Since τ 
does not enter into this equation, the introduction of a tax on labor income, or 
alternatively an increase in the tax rate, causes no change in the optimal length of the   20
workweek. Given h, Eq. (14) determines the optimal fraction of time spent in 
employment. Since there is no change in h, an increase in τ causes a decrease in e. Since 
* e e < τ  and 
* h h = τ , it follows that 
* *h e h e < τ τ . //  
At one level this proposition states the somewhat unsurprising result that a tax-
transfer program of the form considered here leads to fewer hours worked in equilibrium. 
But what is of key importance in this proposition is the result that all of the adjustment in 
hours takes place along the extensive margin, i.e., the fraction of life devoted to work. 
This result is of special importance because of its quantitative implications. Specifically, 
when the extensive margin is the sole margin of adjustment, labor supply is in fact highly 
elastic. Using Eq. (14) to calculate the elasticity of aggregate hours (eh) with respect to 
τ − 1 , we get an elasticity equal to one. Put somewhat differently, the elasticity of hours 
worked for workers with positive hours, which is equal to zero in this example, provides 
no information about the magnitude of the aggregate response. A striking implication of 
this model is that the aggregate labor supply elasticity is a function of technology 
parameters. Specifically, changing the nonconvexity in the mapping from hours of work 
to labor services changes the aggregate elasticity. While it is common to think of the 
aggregate labor supply elasticity as being captured by a preference parameter, as long as 
the nonconvexity in g is sufficiently large to be operative, the value of the preference 
parameter governing the disutility from hours of work has no impact on the aggregate 
elasticity. 
 
4.2.  Constraints on Length of Workweek  
We now analyze the consequences of a binding constraint on workweek length. 
For the purposes of this analysis we consider the formulation of the individual decision   21
problem for both the hours supplied to market formulation as well as the labor services 
formulation.  
From our earlier derivations, recall that once we know the length of the 
workweek, we also know the optimal fraction of time spent in employment. Specifically, 





e =    (15) 





e = .   (16) 
 Let 
* h  and 
* e  denote equilibrium values when there is no hours constraint. Let h  
represent an exogenously imposed hours constraint, and let  ) (h e  denote equilibrium 
values in the case of a binding hours constraint. The empirically interesting case is for an 
interior solution. Hence, we consider the case where  1 ) ( 0 < < h e .  
 
Proposition 2: If 
* h h > , then 
* ) ( e h e < , 
* * ) ( h e h h e < , and 
* * ) ( ) ( l e h l h e < . If 
* h h < , 
then 
* ) ( e h e > , 
* * ) ( h e h h e > , and as we make h  smaller and smaller, first 
* * ) ( ) ( l e h l h e >  and then 
* * ) ( ) ( l e h l h e < .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Given that  ) ( ~ h v  is an increasing function, the inverse 
relationship between h and e is apparent from Eq. (15). Also from Eq. (15), we can easily 
derive an expression for aggregate  hours:     
  
) ( ~ h v
h
eh = .    (17)   22
To determine the effect of a restriction on h on aggregate hours, the comparative static of 
interest is 
   2 ) ( ~
) ( ~ ) ( ~ ) (
h v






.    (18) 
From the first-order conditions for the problem with no hours restriction we know that 








. Hence, if 
* h h < , then 
* * ) ( h e h h e > . As a result, individuals end up with less 
consumption and less leisure. Conversely, if 
* h h > , then 
* * ) ( h e h h e < . From Eq. (16) 




el = .    (19) 
To determine the effect of a restriction on h (which is in essence a restriction on l) on 
aggregate efficiency units, the comparative static of interest is 
   2 ) (
) ( ) ( ) (
l v






.    (20) 
From the first-order conditions for the case with no restrictions on l, we know that 
0 ) ( ) (
* * * = ′ − l v l l v . It is easy to verify that  ) ( ) ( l v l l v ′ −  is monotone decreasing if  ) (l v  is 
convex. Conversely, ) ( ) ( l v l l v ′ −  is monotone increasing if  ) (l v  is concave. Recall that 
) (l v  is first concave and then convex. The unconstrained optimum occurs in the convex 
portion of  ) (l v . Hence, if we restrict the length of the workweek above the optimum, then 
* * ) ( ) ( l e h l h e < . If we restrict the length of the workweek somewhat below the optimum 
(still in convex region), 
* * ) ( ) ( l e h l h e > . However, as we restrict the length of the 
workweek further below the optimum (concave region of  ) (l v ), 
* * ) ( ) ( l e h l h e < . //   23
  In the data, it is common to report the hourly wage or the average compensation 
per hour. Recall that we have normalized the wage per unit of labor services to one. 







= = . The effect of a restriction on hours of work on the hourly 
wage is analyzed in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 3: If 
* h h < , then  ) ( ) (
* h w h w
h h < . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The comparative static of interest is 
   2
) ( ) ( ) (
h




=  (21) 
From Eq. (21) it follows that the hourly wage rate will go down as a result of a reduction 
















. Multiplying both sides by h we get  
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) ( > ′ , the right-hand side of Eq. (22) must be greater than one. 





) ( ~ > ′ . Since the v ~  function is convex, this 
holds. Hence, at least in the neighborhood of the optimum, an upper bound on hours of 
work will result in a reduction in the hourly wage.//   24
  A clear prediction of our model is that a decrease in the length of the workweek 
brings about an increase in the fraction of time spent working or aggregate employment. 
This has often been the motivation behind government policies that restrict hours worked. 
However, many empirical studies (see, e.g., Erbas and Sayers 2001) actually find the 
opposite, i.e., that decreases in the workweek lead to lower employment. In interpreting 
these studies it is important to note that in practice, policies that restrict workweeks are 
often accompanied by an increase in the wage rate (e.g., income may be held constant in 
the face of the decrease in hours worked). Moreover, in our model with the nonlinear 
mapping from hours to labor services, restrictions on workweeks will actually decrease 
income per hour worked, since the policy effectively implies an inefficient scale of 
operation for individual workers.  
In related work, Osuna and Ríos-Rull (2003) look for the tax rate on overtime that 
reduces the workweek from 40 hours to 35 hours. They find that a 12% tax on overtime 
work reduces hours of work from 40 to 35 (a reduction of 12.5%). As a result, 
employment increases by 7%. While employment does increase, aggregate labor supply 
(hours times employment) decreases. Their hours measure is in effect an efficiency unit 
measure. They define hours allocated to work as the total time allotment less leisure and 
commuting time. Our findings are not contrary to that of Osuna and Ríos-Rull (2003). If 
a reduction of hours worked from 40 to 35 hours is a sizable enough reduction to move 
the equilibrium onto the concave portion of  ) (l v , this is exactly what our model focusing 
on the determination of efficiency units suggests would happen.  
 
 
   25
4.3.  Constraints on Working Life 
In our previous analysis of tax and transfer programs, there were no requirements 
that had to be fulfilled in order for individuals to receive the transfer. We can also design 
a policy in which individuals must work a certain fraction of their lifetime in order to 
receive the transfer—namely,  e e ≥ . Naturally, we are only interested in the case with a 
binding constraint on the fraction of time spent in employment. This problem has two 
possible solutions. Individuals can choose to work the mandated fraction of their time e , 
choose the optimal length of the workweek  ) (e h given  e , and receive the transfer T. 
Alternatively, they can choose to forgo the transfer and choose h and e without 
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Given the constraint on e, there is no first-order condition with respect to e. Again, the 
empirically interesting case is for the interior solution with respect to h. The first-order 
condition with respect to h is 
  0 ) ( ' ~
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Recall that  ) (e h  denotes the equilibrium value in the case of a binding constraint on e. 
 
Proposition 4: If  τ e e e > = , then  τ h e h < ) (.  I f   τ e e e < = , then  τ h e h > ) (.   
 
Proof of Proposition 4: We can rewrite Eq. (23) as   26
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If e increases, the right-hand side of Eq. (24) must also increase. Since 









are both decreasing in h, when e increases h must decrease. Thus, we have shown that if 
τ e e e > = , then  τ h e h < ) ( . The second part of the proposition follows by simply reversing 
the argument. // 
Loosely speaking, we can conclude that if the government, for example, raises the 
retirement age through incentives in social security benefits, people will respond by 
shortening the length of the workweek.  
If individuals choose to forgo the transfer, they solve the following problem: 
  ,,
max   log( ) ( )
  . .      (1 ) ( ).
ceh
ce v h





Again, we consider the interior solution to this problem, as it is the empirically interesting 
one. The first-order conditions for this problem are the same conditions as for the 
benchmark model with no tax and transfer policy. Hence, 
* e e =  and 
* h h = . When 
deciding whether or not to forgo the transfer payment, individuals solve 
  () ( ) { }
** * m a x l o g ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) , l o g ( 1 ) () () weg h T v h we g h v h ττ −+ − − −  , 
where to simplify notation we have defined  ) (e h h = .    
  Similar to the analysis just carried out, if a government imposes a mandatory 
retirement policy that is binding, then it is easy to show that the result is an increase in 
hours of work. 
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5.  Two-Occupation Example 
In this section we explicitly consider a model with two occupations. There are 
several motivations for this. First, it allows us to illustrate how our model can account for 
the differences in workweeks across occupations documented earlier in the paper. 
Second, in the context of this model we show how empirical exercises that use cross-
occupation data to infer labor supply elasticities do not isolate the appropriate elasticity 
for predicting the effects of the tax and transfer policies considered earlier.  
    To this end, we extend the baseline model to two occupations. Technological 
features are a very important distinguishing feature of occupations. Here we abstract from 
other possible cross-occupation differences. Consequently, here an occupation is defined 
as a particular  ) (h g  function. We assume that each occupation produces a particular 
intermediate input. In particular, individuals working with the  ) ( 1 1 h g  technology produce 
the intermediate input  1 z  and individuals working with the  ) ( 2 2 h g  technology produce 
the intermediate input  2 z . The intermediate goods technologies are assumed to be linear 
in labor services, and for convenience we normalize marginal products to unity. We 
assume that there is one final consumption good, which is produced by aggregating the 
intermediate goods. In particular,  
     ) , ( 2 1 z z f c = , (25) 
 where  f (.) exhibits constant returns to scale.  
    We assume that the  (.) ~ v  function is the same for individuals in both 
occupations, i.e., that preferences are the same for all individuals.  
    Initially, we assume that a measure μ  of individuals are endowed with skills that 
enable them to work in occupation 1 and a measure  μ − 1  of individuals are endowed   28
with skills that enable them to work occupation 2. Later in this section we will 
endogenize μ .  
    We normalize the price of the final good to one and let 
l
i w denote the wage rate of 
a unit of labor services in occupation i. The decision problem facing an individual 
working in occupation  i=1,2 is 
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max log( ) ( )
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Again, the empirically interesting case is for an interior solution. After some algebra, the 






















e = , (27) 
where i =1,2. Note that the equilibrium conditions that determine hi and ei, Eqs. (26) and 
(27), respectively, are the same as in the case with only one occupation.  
  To facilitate a comparison of outcomes for individuals in the two occupations, we 












h v  and 
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i i i i h h g
η φ ) ( ) ( − = , where  1 < η . 
Intuitively, we would expect a larger fixed set-up cost to result in a longer optimal 
workweek length. As demonstrated in the following proposition, this is confirmed by the 
analytics. 
 
Proposition 5: hi is increasing in φ  and η , ei is decreasing in φ  and η , and  i i h e  is 
decreasing in φ  and η .    29
Proof of Proposition 5: Given the functional forms proposed above, we can solve Eq. 
(26) for hi. We get   











From this expression it is apparent that hi is increasing in both φ  and η . We have already 
previously noted that ei is decreasing in hi. It follows that ei is decreasing in both φ  and 
η . We know from before that  i i h e  is decreasing in hi. Combining this observation with 
the fact that hi is increasing in both φ  and η , we find that  i i h e  is decreasing in both φ  
and η . // 
As shown in Section 1, workweek lengths differ considerably across occupations. Our 
framework is able to reconcile this feature of the data.  
  All our findings regarding the impact of the g(.) function on the optimal length of 
the workweek, as well as aggregate hours worked, hold for a general constant returns to 
scale aggregator  ) , ( 2 1 z z f c = . In the following analysis we will assume a specific 
functional form for this aggregator. Specifically, 
θ θ − =
1
2 1 z z c .   
  Having compared the labor supply outcomes for different occupations, it is of 
interest to compare the wage rates in the two occupations. As noted previously, the wage 
rate, w
l, is the wage rate per unit of labor services. The wage rates reported in the data are 
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Both types of individuals are paid the value of their marginal products per unit of labor 
services produced. This implies that  1 1 p w
l =  and  2 2 p w
l = , where  1 p  is the price of  1 z  
















h = . We can derive an expression for the relative price 
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We know that in equilibrium  ) ( 1 1 1 1 h g e z μ =  and  ) ( ) 1 ( 2 2 2 2 h g e z μ − = . Substituting 

















= . (31) 
In the preceding analysis we have treated μ  as exogenous. One way to 
endogenize μ  is to assume that individuals make an occupational choice decision at time 
zero, and that occupation is fixed thereafter. This would imply that individuals are 
allocated across the two occupations such that in equilibrium the individuals in the two 
occupations receive the same utility. This requires that  
  ) ( ~ ) log( ) ( ~ ) log( 2 2 2 1 1 1 h v e c h v e c − = − . (32) 
Substituting in for  i c , i=1,2, from the budget constraint, Eq. (32) reduces to 
  ) ( ~ ) ( ~ 1
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Equation (27) further implies that  0
1
1










, which in turn implies that  μ θ = . 
In other words, input shares determine the distribution of individuals across occupations.   31
As a result, individuals in the two occupations enjoy the same consumption. Naturally 
this implies that incomes across the two types of individuals are equalized. Note, 












= .   (34) 
Recall that if  2 1 h h > , then  2 2 1 1 h e h e < . Hence, we can conclude that the occupation with 
the longer workweek will have a higher wage.  
We now consider the implications of this analysis for uncovering labor supply 
elasticities using cross-section data. Given Eq. (27) and our assumed functional forms, 
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Taking logs we can rewrite this expression in the more standard way: 


























This expression implies that if one looks at the covariation of wages and hours, one will 
get an estimate of the curvature parameter γ. Empirical studies based on cross-section 
data typically find this parameter to be quite small, i.e., that γ is relatively large (see, e.g., 
the survey article of Pencavel, 1986). However, what is interesting to note is that if we 
analyze a tax and transfer scheme in this two-occupation economy similar to the one 
considered earlier in the single occupation model, one obtains exactly the same results as 
before. Specifically, workweeks remain constant and all adjustment occurs along the 
extensive margin. This implies that the value of γ is actually irrelevant in determining the 
magnitude of the decrease in aggregate hours of work.   32
  In a model with identical individuals in which occupations are equally costly to 
enter, our analysis delivers sharp predictions about workweeks and working lives. One 
can note that if μ is taken as exogenous, perhaps because some individuals do not have 
the skill necessary to enter, these results may be affected. Additionally, in this case one 
cannot infer the preference parameter γ from cross-section data without knowing 
something about how these costs differ across occupations. To see this, we now extend 
the preceding analysis to the case where there is a fixed utility cost associated with 
entering each occupation. We allow the utility cost to differ across occupations. One 
interpretation for this cost is the time individuals give up or the consumption they forgo 
in order to train for an occupation. The utility cost mi enters the decision problem of 
consumer i  in the following way:  
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After some algebra, we can write the equivalent of Eq. (32) as 
  2 1
1
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.   (37) 
Given this expression, we can show that  θ μ >  if  2 1 m m < . If this is the case,  1 2 c c > . 
That is, individual 2 receives more of the consumption good in order to compensate for 
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.   (39)   33
This analysis cautions against using the covariation of wage and hours to infer the 
magnitude of γ without knowing the magnitudes of the fixed utility costs.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
  Lifetime labor supply of an individual is usefully characterized by two key 
numbers: the fraction of life spent in employment, and the hours of work while 
employed. We build a model that delivers this characterization as an equilibrium 
outcome. A nonconvexity in the mapping from hours of work to labor services provided 
is key to this prediction. The model represents a significant simplification over previous 
formulations. We consider the qualitative effects of several policy changes to illustrate 
both the tractability of the formulation and its ability to capture important economic 
forces. Life cycle effects can easily be added to the framework presented here (see 
Rogerson and Wallenius, 2007), further illustrating the usefulness of this abstraction.    34
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